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ARISTOTLE AND THE ANCIENT
PUZZLE ABOUT COMING TO BE
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. Introduction
A’s project in the ﬁrst book of the Physics is to develop a
theory of the principles of natural beings. According to this theory,
as set out in Physics . , the generation of a natural substance is a
process whereby an underlying substratum (the matter) goes from
having a certain privation to having the relevant form. The result-
ing substance is a composite of the substratum and the form. These
three items—the substratum, the form, and the privation—are the
principles of natural beings.
Aristotle holds that a major beneﬁt of this theory of principles
is that it allows him to solve a long-standing puzzle about the pos-
sibility of coming to be. But how it is supposed to do this is not
immediately obvious, in large part because it is not obvious how he
understands the puzzle. The puzzle is described at the beginning
of Physics . :
ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.
ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄν-
των ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καί φασιν οὔτε
γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι
τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι·
οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑπο-
κεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες οὐδ ᾿ εἶναι πολλά
φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. (a–)
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And let us next say that, in addition, it is only in this way that the puzzle
of the ancients is resolved. For the ﬁrst people to proceed philosophically
got turned oﬀ course in their enquiry after truth and the nature of things,
driven as it were onto some other road by their inexperience, and they say
that none of the things that are either comes to be or passes away. This
is because what comes to be must come to be either from what is or from
what is not, and yet it is impossible [for a thing to come to be] from either
of these. For what is does not come to be, since it already is; and nothing
could have come to be from what is not, since something must underlie.
And what is more, exaggerating what next follows from this, they deny
that the many are, and say that only what is itself is.
In this paper I want to do two things. First, I want to explain the
puzzle about coming to be as it is described here. The interpreta-
tion I shall defend is a relatively straightforward one, although it
has generally been overlooked in the literature on the passage. Se-
cond, I want to explain howAristotle’s theory of principles resolves
the puzzle, as I suggest we interpret it.
My plan is as follows. I shall start, in Section , by addressing
two preliminary questions: (a) about the identity of the ‘ancients’
to whom Aristotle ascribes the puzzle; and (b) whether the puzzle
concerns coming into existence or coming to be such-and-such. I shall
then, in Section , turn to the question of how to understand the
puzzle’s two options about coming to be (‘what comes to be must
come to be either from what is or from what is not’). This is where I
give my interpretation of the puzzle and explain its advantages over
other interpretations. After that, in Section , I shall examine Aris-
totle’s discussion of how the puzzle is to be resolved.
. Two preliminary questions
We can begin with the question of who the ‘ancients’ are. Like
most other interpreters, I take Aristotle to be thinking primarily of
the Eleatics, speciﬁcally Parmenides and Melissus. But he does not
name names, and his description of these people as ‘the ﬁrst to pro-
 The reference is to the theory of principles given in the previous chapter. It is
only with this theory that we are able to solve the puzzle.
 The phrases ἐξ ὄντος and ἐκ μὴ ὄντος may be translated in diﬀerent ways. For
now I use the translations ‘from what is’ and ‘from what is not’; later in the paper I
shall also use the alternative translations ‘from being’ and ‘from non-being’.
 He does mention Parmenides by name at the beginning of .  (a), but this
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ceed philosophically’ (οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι) might be thought
to suggest that he is talking about early Greek philosophers in ge-
neral, rather than about the Eleatics in particular.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that he has the Eleatics uppermost in
mind. We can detect a sly allusion to Parmenides’ roads of enquiry
(ὁδοὶ διζήσιος) in the claim that these philosophers were ‘turned oﬀ
course in their enquiry . . . driven as it were onto some other road
[ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην] by their inexperience [ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας]’.This is remi-
niscent of Parmenides B . , where the goddess warns the kouros
not to let ‘habit born of much experience [ἔθος πολύπειρον]’ force
him down the wrong road.
Further evidence that Aristotle is thinking of the Eleatics is that
he says these philosophers were also led, as a result of their denial
of coming to be and passing away, to deny that ‘many things are’,
and to say that ‘only what is itself is’ (a–; cf. b–). This
sounds very much like Eleatic monism, and closely matches Aris-
totle’s description of Eleatic monism in other passages.
My second preliminary question is how we should understand
the ancients’ conclusion: that coming to be is impossible. The verb
γίγνεσθαι (‘to come to be’) can denote coming into existence, but
it also has an incomplete use: ‘to come to be F ’. So the argument
Aristotle presents might be denying the possibility of coming into
existence, or it might be denying the possibility of coming to be F
(for any value of F).
I take the puzzle to be ﬁrst and foremost a puzzle about coming
into existence. Immediately before he articulates the puzzle, Aris-
need not imply that he takes the puzzle described in the previous chapter to be a
speciﬁcally Eleatic puzzle.
 This is the view of J. Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford,
), –.
 Cf. also F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London, ),  n. ; A.
Madigan, ‘Commentary on Loux’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in An-
cient Philosophy,  (), – at .
 Note that the allusion to Parmenides’ roads of enquiry is there even if the correct
reading at a– is ἀπορίας (the reading of E, J, and Simplicius) and not ἀπειρίας.
 Compare the description of Parmenides’ position at Phys. . , a (there is
nothing else ‘beside what is itself ’) and also at Metaph. Α , b– (‘what is is
one, and nothing else is’).
 For the former interpretation see e.g. P. H.Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford,Aris-
totle:The Physics,Books I–IV (Cambridge, Mass., ), ; Ross, Physics, ; W.
Charlton, Aristotle: Physics, Books I and II [Physics I–II] (Oxford, ), . For
the latter interpretation see A. Code, ‘Aristotle’s Response to Quine’s Objections to
Modal Logic’ [‘Response’], Journal of Philosophical Logic,  (), – at .
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totle says that these philosophers ‘say that none of the things that
are either comes to be or passes away’ (a). The puzzle that
follows (‘for what comes to be must come to be either from what is
or from what is not’) explains the reasoning behind this denial of
coming to be and passing away. The verb ‘comes to be’ at a is
most naturally taken in the sense of ‘comes into existence’, paired as
it is with the verb ‘passes away’ (φθείρεσθαι). So the uses of ‘comes
to be’ in the following lines, in the description of the puzzle, are
most naturally taken in the same way. And so it would seem that
Aristotle is describing a puzzle about coming into existence.
Note that this reading is quite consistent with the fact that Aris-
totle takes the puzzle to have led to the rejection of ‘change in ge-
neral’ (b). This is because the possibility of other kinds of
change can seem to depend on the possibility of coming into and
going out of existence. Indeed, the Eleatics argued against other
kinds of change on exactly this basis. Parmenides’ argument against
motion (κίνησις) appeals to his earlier rejection of coming into and
going out of existence (B . –). And Melissus reasons from the
impossibility of coming into and going out of existence to the im-
possibility of alteration and rearrangement (B . – and . ).
. The puzzle
We can now turn to the details of the argument against coming to
be. In Aristotle’s presentation, the ﬁrst premiss of the argument is
that ‘what comes to be must come to be either from what is or from
what is not’ (a–). Both options are argued to be impossible
(a–), and from this it is inferred that nothing can come to be.
It is standard to distinguish two types of reading of the ﬁrst
premiss. Like the verb γίγνεσθαι, the verb εἶναι (‘to be’) has a com-
plete and an incomplete use. Correspondingly, there appear to be
two diﬀerent ways in which one might take the distinction between
coming to be ‘fromwhat is’ and ‘fromwhat is not’. On the ﬁrst type
of reading (the ‘existential’ reading), ‘is’ has its complete use and
 For a thing to pass away is for it to cease to exist. Aristotle sometimes uses
‘passing away’ in connection with cases of non-substantial change; for example, the
process whereby a thing ceases to be musical can be described as ‘the passing away
of the musical into the non-musical’ (see Phys. . , b–). But even here some-
thing’s ‘passing away’ is a matter of its ceasing to exist. I take it that X passes away
‘into Y’ whenX goes out of existence and is replaced byY.
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means ‘exists’: what comes into existence must do so either from
what exists or from what does not exist. On the second type of
reading (the ‘incomplete’ reading), the phrases ‘from what is’ and
‘from what is not’ are elliptical and require a complement. Ross,
who endorses the second type of reading, suggests that the claim is
that anything that comes into existence must do so either fromwhat
is it or from what is not it.
Both types of reading have been thought to face diﬃculties. The
diﬃculties emerge when one considers the arguments given against
each option:
. . . it is impossible [for a thing to come to be] from either of these [sc. either
fromwhat is or fromwhat is not]. For () what is does not come to be, since
it already is; and () nothing could have come to be from what is not, since
something must underlie. (a–)
Clearly we want a reading of the two options—‘from what is’ and
‘fromwhat is not’—thatmakes sense of both of these subarguments.
But the existential reading seems unable to make sense of the ﬁrst
subargument. Sean Kelsey puts the problem as follows:
The trouble [with the existential reading] is that the proposal that things
come to be from ‘what is’ appears untouched by the objection raised against
it, namely that ‘it is already.’ Why should it follow, just because Socrates
comes to be from something that ‘is’ (period), that he already was, before
he came to be? Surely he might have come from some other thing that ‘is,’
for example from an egg or a seed.
It is true that what already is (what already exists) cannot now come
into existence. As Kelsey explains, the problem is that this seems
irrelevant to the matter at hand. What we want to know is why
a new thing cannot come into existence from what already exists.
To change the example, suppose that a house comes into existence
 For this type of reading, see M. J. Loux, ‘Aristotle and Parmenides: An In-
terpretation of Physics Α ’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy,  (), – at –; T. M. Horstschäfer, ‘Über Prinzipien’: Eine
Untersuchung zur methodischen und inhaltlichen Geschlossenheit des ersten Buches der
Physik des Aristoteles (Berlin, ), –.
 Ross, Physics, . Other defenders of this type of reading include Code, ‘Re-
sponse’, –, and S. Waterlow,Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics:
A Philosophical Study (Oxford, ), –. The most detailed exposition and de-
fence of an incomplete reading is A. Anagnostopoulos, ‘Aristotle’s Parmenidean Di-
lemma’ [‘Dilemma’], Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), –.
 S. Kelsey, ‘Aristotle Physics I ’ [‘I ’], Phronesis,  (), – at –.
See also Ross, Physics, ; Code, ‘Response’, .
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from something that already exists—a pile of bricks, say.Once the
bricks exist, it is obviously true that they cannot come into exis-
tence. But what we want to know is why the house cannot come into
existence. The house and the bricks are non-identical (the house
does not yet exist, the bricks do). So the fact that the bricks already
exist does not mean that the house cannot come into existence.
The incomplete reading, by contrast, seems to have a hard time
making sense of the second subargument. As Kelsey puts the diﬃ-
culty, ‘Why should it follow, just because Socrates comes to be from
something that is not Socrates, that he comes to be from nothing at
all (or from nothing that “underlies”)?’ Again, to switch the ex-
ample, think of the house and the bricks from which it comes to be.
In this case, the house comes into existence from what is not it: the
house and the bricks are non-identical. The diﬃculty is: why should
it follow from this that nothing underlies the process of coming into
existence? It seems that we have just identiﬁed something that un-
derlies the process, namely, the bricks.
Motivated by the diﬃculties facing the existential and incomplete
readings, Kelsey suggests an alternative reading of the distinction
between coming to be from what is and from what is not. On this
view, the distinction should be interpreted as a distinction between
coming to be from what is a substance and coming to be from what
is not a substance.
Kelsey suggests that the ﬁrst option (a thing comes to be from
what is a substance) is ruled out on the grounds that it violates an
apparently plausible principle about generation: ‘nothing can come
to be the kind of thing it already is’. Kelsey takes the argument to
assume that whenever one entity comes to be another, what the ori-
ginal entity comes to be is a substance (among other things). Thus,
a new substance cannot come to be from a precursor which is also
 I shall follow Aristotle himself in using artefacts as illustrative examples, with
the caveat that the real concern of Physics  is the generation of natural beings.
 Kelsey, ‘I ’, . Cf. also Loux, ‘Aristotle and Parmenides’, .
 On Anagnostopoulos’s version of the incomplete reading, the second option
about coming to be is that what is F comes to be from what is not F. This is ruled
out, Anagnostopoulos suggests, on the grounds that ‘what is not F ’ is not itself what
underlies the process of becoming F (‘Dilemma’, –). But as I read the argu-
ment against the second option (‘since something must underlie’), the implication is
that—on this option—nothing underlies. Accordingly, I think that a defender of the
incomplete reading must explain why, if what is F comes to be from what is not F,
it seems to follow that nothing underlies this process (and not merely: that what is
not F does not itself underlie this process).  Kelsey, ‘I ’, –.
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a substance, without this violating the principle that ‘nothing can
come to be the kind of thing it already is’. This is why a thing can-
not come to be from something that is a substance.
The second option (a thing comes to be from what is not a sub-
stance) is ruled out on the grounds that non-substances cannot
‘underlie’. Here we might think of Cat. , a–b, where non-
substances are taken to be incapable of undergoing, or being the
subjects of, changes. Since anything that comes to be must do so
either from what is a substance or from what is not a substance, it
therefore follows that nothing can come to be.
Kelsey stresses that an important merit of this reading is that it
makes the puzzle depend on principles that Aristotle himself ac-
cepts (at least in some form or other). This allows us to explain
why he takes the puzzle seriously. Nevertheless, the reading also
has its drawbacks. One problem is that, as we have seen, Aristotle
regards the puzzle as an Eleatic puzzle. Yet on Kelsey’s interpre-
tation the puzzle presupposes a sophisticated Aristotelian distinc-
tion between substances and non-substances, and itmay be doubted
whetherAristotle wouldwant to credit his Eleatic predecessors with
such a distinction. A second problem is that Aristotle gives us no in-
dication that he is using ‘is’ and ‘is not’ to mean ‘is a substance’ and
‘is not a substance’. If he hadwanted to distinguish between coming
to be from what is and from what is not a substance, he could easily
have done so explicitly. The fact that he does not do so suggests that
it would be preferable for us to ﬁnd—if we can—an interpretation
that takes the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘is not’ at face value.
I think, therefore, that we should reconsider the prospects for an
existential reading of the two options. On the existential reading,
recall, the claim is that what comes into existence must do so either
from what exists or from what does not exist. Now, this is stand-
ardly taken as giving us two options about the precursor of the ge-
nerated thing. (The ‘precursor’ of the generated thing is whatever
it is that becomes the generated thing, as the seed becomes the plant,
or the bricks become the house.) Either the precursor is something
that exists, or it is something that does not exist. On this version
of the existential reading we run into the problem raised earlier: it
is diﬃcult to make sense of the argument against the ﬁrst option
(‘what is does not come to be, since it already is’). The fact that the
 Ibid. .
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precursor already exists is irrelevant to the matter at hand, given
that the precursor and the generated thing are non-identical.
There is, however, another possibility. We could also take the two
options as options not about the precursor of the generated thing,
but about the generated thing itself . More precisely, we could take
them to be options about the pre-generation state of the thing that
comes to be. Did the generated thing come to be fromwhat is—that
is to say, from its previously being in a state of existence? Or did it
come to be from what is not—that is to say, from its previously be-
ing non-existent?
My proposal is that once we understand the two options in this
way, we avoid the above problem for the existential reading. In
other words, if we understand the two options as being about the
pre-generation state of the generated thing, it is possible to make
sense of both of the subarguments.
Start with the argument against the ﬁrst option. On the inter-
pretation I am suggesting, the ﬁrst option is that the generated
thing comes into existence from its previously being existent. This
is clearly impossible, and it is impossible for exactly the reasonAris-
totle gives in the text: something that exists cannot now come into
existence, for it already exists. The generated thing’s existence is
naturally thought of as the end state of the process of generation.
Something that is already in this state cannot now come into it, just
as something that is already pale cannot now come to be pale.
The second option, on the present interpretation, is that the ge-
nerated thing comes into existence from its previously being non-
existent. This is meant to be impossible because ‘something must
underlie’. Once again, our interpretation allows us to understand
this. It is tempting to conceive of coming to be as a change or a
process undergone by the thing that comes to be. This is encour-
aged by the way we speak: one might easily suppose that, just as the
 On this interpretation, the function of ‘from’ (ἐκ) in Aristotle’s formulation of
the puzzle is the same as in the sentence ‘The person changes to dark from pale [ἐκ
λευκοῦ]’ (cf. Phys. . , b–; Cat. , a–). Here ‘from pale’ indicates the
pre-change state of the thing that comes to be dark: the person comes to be dark
from their previously being pale.
 Early in his paper, Loux gives a paraphrase of the puzzle which takes the two
options in the way I am suggesting, as concerning the pre-generation state of the
generated thing: ‘given any object, x, if x has come to be, then either x preexisted its
coming to be or it did not . . .’ (‘Aristotle and Parmenides’, ). However, this is
not Loux’s considered view. On the interpretation that he goes on to oﬀer (–),
the two options concern the generated thing’s precursor.
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subject of the process coming to be pale is the thing that comes to
be pale, and the subject of the process coming to be knowledgeable
is the thing that comes to be knowledgeable, so too the subject of
the process coming to be is the thing that comes to be. Yet on this
conception of coming to be it seems impossible for a thing to come
to be from its previously being non-existent. For how could some-
thing that is initially non-existent undergo a process or a change?
After all, something non-existent cannot be aﬀected in any way,
and given that it cannot be aﬀected, there would seem to be noth-
ing that could ever cause it to go from one state (non-existence) to
another (existence). In short, if a thing comes to be from being
non-existent, generation would seem to be a change whose subject
(at least at the outset) does not exist, which is impossible: in any
change, ‘something must underlie’.
We can therefore see how the present interpretation makes good
sense of the puzzle described at a–. There is reason to think
that if a new thing comes into existence, it cannot do so from its
being existent, since its existence would seem to be the end state of
the process. It is also tempting to think that the new thing cannot
come into existence from its being non-existent, since it is hard to
see how something non-existent could undergo (be the subject of,
underlie) a change. Moreover, it is easy to see why these two op-
tions should seem to be exhaustive. Prior to coming into existence,
the generated thing either existed or did not exist. So it is natural
to suppose that it came into existence either from its being existent
or from its being non-existent. As neither option seems possible, it
seems to follow that nothing can come into existence.
This interpretation has signiﬁcant advantages over the alter-
natives. Unlike Kelsey’s interpretation, it avoids making the
puzzle presuppose an Aristotelian distinction between substances
and non-substances, and it instead takes the passage’s distinc-
tion between being and non-being at face value—as a distinction
between (as we would put it) existence and non-existence. Further,
as we have just seen, the present interpretation allows us to give
satisfying explanations of both of the subarguments, making it
 Compare Parmenides B . –: ‘And what need would have stirred it | later
or earlier, beginning from nothing, to grow?’ (τί δ ᾿ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν | ὕστερον ἢ
πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν;). If, prior to coming into existence, the thing did
not exist—i.e. was nothing—what could ever have ‘stirred’ it into coming to be? (For
this interpretation of Parmenides’ argument, cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philoso-
phers, rev. edn. (London, ), .)
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preferable to the ﬁrst two readings we considered (the incomplete
reading and the standard version of the existential reading).
. Resolving the puzzle
Having considered Aristotle’s account of the puzzle, I next want
to examine his discussion of the puzzle’s solution, which occupies
the rest of chapter . I take it that the main goal of the remaining
part of the chapter is to justify the earlier claim that we can resolve
the Eleatic puzzle by means of the theory of principles of chapter
 (a–). Aristotle now mentions two ways (τρόποι) of address-
ing the puzzle. Most of his time is spent on the ﬁrst way, which
appeals to a distinction between coming to be from something non-
accidentally and coming to be from something accidentally (a–
b). He then brieﬂy alludes to (but does not spell out) a second way
of addressing the puzzle, which appeals to the distinction between
actuality and potentiality (b–). Finally, in a short conclud-
ing section, he locates what he takes to be the ultimate source of the
Eleatics’ confusion about the possibility of coming to be (b–).
.. The ﬁrst way of addressing the puzzle
Aristotle’s ﬁrst way of addressing the puzzle distinguishes between
coming to be from something non-accidentally and coming to be
from something accidentally. This distinction is explained in the
following lines:
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι
τὸ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ τὸ ὂν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ
ὁτιοῦν τόδε γίγνεσθαι, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὐθὲν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι ἢ
πάσχειν ἢ ἐξ ἰατροῦ εἶναί τι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, ὥστ ᾿ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο διχῶς λέγεται, δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὄντος καὶ τὸ ὂν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. οἰκοδομεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἰατρὸς
οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ ᾿ ᾗ οἰκοδόμος, καὶ λευκὸς γίγνεται οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ ᾿ ᾗ μέλας·
ἰατρεύει δὲ καὶ ἀνίατρος γίγνεται ᾗ ἰατρός. ἐπεὶ δὲ μάλιστα λέγομεν κυρίως τὸν
 This may initially strike us as odd, given his earlier claim that ‘it is only in this
way [μοναχῶς οὕτω] that the puzzle of the ancients is resolved’ (a–). That claim
might seem to imply that there is only one way of addressing the puzzle. Yet the
earlier claim is, in fact, consistent with what happens later in chapter . I suggest
that at a– Aristotle simply means that it is only when we have his theory of
principles that we are able to resolve the puzzle. This is compatible with there being
multiple ways of addressing the puzzle, as long as each of these makes use of Aris-
totle’s theory of principles.
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ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἰατροῦ, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰατρὸς ταῦτα πάσχῃ ἢ
ποιῇ ἢ γίγνηται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο σημαίνει, τὸ ᾗ
μὴ ὄν. (a–b)
So those philosophers held this opinion for the aforementioned reasons.
We, on the other hand, say that to come to be from being or from non-being,
or forwhat is not orwhat is to do something, or undergo something, or come
to be any particular this—all this is in a way no diﬀerent from the doctor
doing or undergoing something, or from being or coming to be something
from doctor. So, since these [sc. the phrases referring to the doctor] are said
in two ways, it is clear that ‘from being’, ‘what is does’, and ‘what is under-
goes’ are also [said in two ways]. On the one hand, the doctor builds a house
not qua doctor but qua housebuilder, and he comes to be pale not qua doc-
tor but qua dark. On the other hand, he heals and comes to be unmedical
qua doctor. But since it is most proper to say that ‘the doctor’ does some-
thing or undergoes [something], or comes to be [something] ‘from doctor’,
if he undergoes, does, or comes to be these things qua doctor, it is clear
that ‘coming to be from non-being’ also signiﬁes this: [coming to be from
non-being] qua non-being.
Think of a doctor who also happens to be a skilled housebuilder,
and who builds herself a house. It is true that the doctor builds a
house. But it is not qua doctor that she builds a house. It is not
by virtue of her being a doctor that she is able to perform the task
in question, but by virtue of her being a housebuilder. Contrast
this with the doctor’s healing one of her patients. It is true that the
doctor heals her patient. And in this case it is qua doctor that she
performs the task in question. It is precisely by virtue of her being
a doctor that she is able to heal her patient. We can put this dis-
tinction by saying that the doctor builds accidentally, whereas the
doctor heals non-accidentally.
The same sort of distinction can be drawn with regard to com-
ing to be something from something. Think of a doctor who, in the
winter, loses her summer tan. It is true—according to Aristotle—
that the doctor comes to be pale from (being a) doctor. But it is not
qua doctor that she undergoes this process. It is not by virtue of her
having been a doctor that she was able to become pale, but by virtue
of her having been tanned. Contrast this with the doctor’s becoming
 At this point in the text I ﬁnd it preferable to translate the phrases ἐξ ὄντος and
ἐκ μὴ ὄντος as ‘from being’ and ‘from non-being’. My reason is that Aristotle’s posi-
tive account of coming to be ἐκ μὴ ὄντος exploits an ambiguity in this phrase which is
preserved by the translation ‘from non-being’, but lost in the translation ‘from what
is not’. See n.  below.
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‘unmedical’. (Suppose she stops practising and eventually loses her
expertise.) It is true that the doctor becomes unmedical from (be-
ing a) doctor. And in this case it is qua doctor that she undergoes
the process. It is precisely by virtue of her having been a doctor—
that is, by virtue of her having had medical expertise—that she was
able to lose this expertise and become unmedical. We can put the
distinction by saying that the doctor comes to be pale from (being
a) doctor accidentally, whereas the doctor comes to be unmedical
from (being a) doctor non-accidentally.
Generalizing now, we can state Aristotle’s distinction as follows:
The F φs non-accidentally just in case:
(i) the F φs; and
(ii) it is by virtue of its being F that the F is able to φ.
The F φs accidentally just in case:
(i) the F φs; but
(ii) it is not by virtue of its being F that the F is able to φ.
X comes to be F from G non-accidentally just in case:
(i) X comes to be F from G; and
(ii) it is by virtue of X’s having been G that X was able to come
to be F.
X comes to be F from G accidentally just in case:
(i) X comes to be F from G; but
(ii) it is not by virtue of X’s having been G that X was able to
come to be F.
... Coming to be from non-being With this distinction in place,
Aristotle can use it to identify unproblematic ways in which, ac-
cording to his theory of principles, a thing comes to be both from
being and from non-being. He begins with coming to be from non-
being:
ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες ἀπέστησαν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοσοῦτον
προσηγνόησαν, ὥστε μηθὲν οἴεσθαι γίγνεσθαι μηδ ᾿ εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ ᾿ ἀνελεῖν
πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν μηθὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ μὴ
ὄντος, ὅμως μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ἐκ γὰρ τῆς
 Reading ὅμως with manuscripts F, I, and J, rather than Cornford’s emendation
πὼς. Cf. L. Angioni, Aristóteles: Física I–II (Campinas, ), .
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στερήσεως, ὅ ἐστι καθ ᾿ αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος γίγνεταί τι· θαυμάζεται
δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαί τι, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος). (b–)
Failing to make this distinction, those people gave the matter up. And on
account of this ignorance they went so far wrong, in addition, that they
thought that none of the other things either comes to be or is, but in-
stead they abolished coming to be as a whole. But we ourselves also say
that nothing comes to be from non-being without qualiﬁcation; yet [we
say that] a thing nevertheless does come to be from non-being, that is to
say, [it comes from non-being] accidentally. (For a thing comes to be from
the privation, which is in itself non-being—this not being present [in the
product]. But this is thought amazing, and it seems impossible for some-
thing to come to be in this way, from non-being.)
Aristotle holds that there is a sense in which the Eleatics were right
to deny that a thing comes to be from non-being: a thing does not
come to be from non-being ‘without qualiﬁcation’, that is to say,
non-accidentally. But, crucially, this is not the only way of com-
ing to be from non-being. On Aristotle’s own view of generation, a
thing comes to be from non-being accidentally, and this is unprob-
lematic.
Why does Aristotle hold that a thing comes to be from non-being
accidentally rather than non-accidentally? We can explain this by
drawing on our above account of the accidentally/non-accidentally
distinction. If that account is correct, X comes to be from non-
being accidentally (rather than non-accidentally) just in case:
(i) X comes to be from non-being; but
(ii) it is not by virtue ofX’s having been a non-being thatX was
able to come to be.
Begin with (ii). Why, exactly, would it be wrong to say that a
statue (say) was able to come to be by virtue of its having been a
non-being? Aristotle does not tell us, but his thought may be the
 Here Aristotle refers to the supposed further consequences of the Eleatic rejec-
tion of generation: ﬁrst, monism (‘none of the other things [sc. besides what is itself]
either comes to be or is’); second, the rejection of change in general (‘they abolished
coming to be as a whole’).
 The phrase ‘not being present [in the product]’ (οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος) reminds us
that although a thing comes to be from the privation, the privation does not survive
the change. Contrast the substratum: a thing also comes to be from the substratum,
and this remains as a component of the ﬁnal product. Cf. the description of the ma-
terial cause at Phys. . , b–: ‘that from which a thing comes to be and which
is present [in the product]’ (τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος). Cf. also . , a–.
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following. Many non-beings are necessary non-beings: non-beings
that cannot possibly come to be. (For Aristotle examples would
include a second cosmos or an inﬁnitely extended body.) So the
mere fact that the statue was previously a non-being fails to explain
why it was able to come to be. Rather, what explains this is the
fact that the statue—or, more accurately, the thing that now has
the form of the statue—was previously an unshaped block of marble:
an entity capable of possessing the statue form, but actually lack-
ing it.
Now to (i). According to Aristotle’s theory of principles we can
say that the generated thing comes to be from the relevant priva-
tion, inter alia. We can say that the statue, for instance, comes to
be from the privation of the form of the statue. Aristotle tells us that
the privation ‘is in itself non-being [μὴ ὄν]’ (cf. also . , a–).
I suggest that by this he means that a privation is a particular kind
of non-being: the absence or non-existence of a particular form, in
the sort of thing that is capable of receiving that form. (This is just
what a privation is; hence a privation is essentially or ‘in itself ’ a
kind of non-being.) Thus, if it is true that the statue comes to be
from the relevant privation, it is also true that the statue comes to
be ‘from non-being’.
If a thing comes to be ‘from non-being’ in this way, we do not en-
counter the problem raised in the puzzle (‘nothing could have come
to be from non-being, since something must underlie’, a–).
When the statue comes to be from the relevant privation, what hap-
pens is that an existing thing, the marble, changes from having the
 A thing is also said to come to be from the substratum and from the form: . ,
b–. I should point out that, unlike some interpreters (e.g. Loux, ‘Aristotle
and Parmenides’, ), I do not think that at b– Aristotle is either claiming
or assuming that a thing comes to be from the relevant privation only accidentally.
This would be hard to square with . , a–b, which strongly suggests that he
thinks that a thing comes to be from the relevant privation non-accidentally.
 In saying that something is (a) ‘non-being’ (μὴ ὄν), Aristotle sometimes means
that it is an instance of what is not, or what is non-existent. Prior to coming to be,
the statue was a non-being in this sense. However, this does not seem to be what he
means when he says that the privation is in itself ‘non-being’. After all, privations
exist. So my suggestion is that the privation is ‘non-being’ in the sense of being the
absence or non-existence of a particular form. This is why I use the expression ‘non-
being’—rather than ‘what is not’—to translate μὴ ὄν in this part of the chapter. The
privation is essentially (a kind of) non-being, but it is not essentially an instance of
what is not.
 Compare: Green is a species of colour. So, if it is true that the apple comes to
be red from green, it is also true that the apple comes to be red from (a) colour.
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privation (a kind of non-being) to having the form. Since themarble
is the subject of this process, and exists throughout, we avoid the
Eleatic worry that nothing underlies.
... Coming to be from being In the next section Aristotle adds
that there is likewise an unproblematic way in which, according
to his theory of principles, a thing can be said to come to be from
being:
ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ ᾿ ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῴου ζῷον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ
τινὸς ζῴου τι ζῷον· οἷον εἰ κύων ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο. γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ
μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῴου, ἀλλ ᾿ οὐχ ᾗ ζῷον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ
ἤδη τοῦτο· εἰ δέ τι μέλλει γίγνεσθαι ζῷον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἐκ ζῴου
ἔσται, καὶ εἴ τι ὄν, οὐκ ἐξ ὄντος· οὐδ ᾿ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἴρηται
ἡμῖν τί σημαίνει, ὅτι ᾗ μὴ ὄν. (b–)
And in the same way, we say that neither does a thing come to be from
being, nor does what is come to be, except accidentally. But in this way
[sc. accidentally] we say that this [sc. what is] too comes to be; in the same
way, for instance, as if an animal should come be from an animal, that is,
a particular animal from a particular animal. For example, if a dog should
come to be from a horse. For the dog would then come to be not only from
a particular animal [sc. a horse], but also from an animal, although it would
not come to be qua animal. For this [sc. animal] already belongs [sc. to the
horse]. But if something is going to come to be an animal non-accidentally,
it will not do so from an animal. And if something is going to come to be
a being [non-accidentally], it will not do so from being. Nor indeed will it
do so from non-being. For we have said what ‘from non-being’ signiﬁes,
namely, ‘qua non-being’.
This section makes two main points, each of which is stated in the
opening sentence:
 I have not said anything here about the second sentence of the parenthesis:
‘But this is thought amazing, and it seems impossible for something to come to be
in this way, from non-being’ (b–). I take the point of this sentence to be that
although there is an unproblematic way in which a thing comes to be from non-
being, this (i.e. coming to be from non-being) is nevertheless thought to be impos-
sible.
 Following the manuscript reading rather than the supplement proposed by E.
Laas (Aristotelische Textes-Studien (Berlin, ), ) and adopted by Ross: εἰ κύων
〈ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος〉 ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο (‘if a dog should come to be 〈from a dog, or a
horse〉 from a horse’). It is now generally accepted that this supplement is mistaken.
See e.g. H.Wagner,Aristoteles: Physikvorlesung (Berlin, ), ; Loux, ‘Aristotle
and Parmenides’, ; Kelsey, ‘I ’,  n. ; Anagnostopoulos, ‘Dilemma’, .
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(A) A thing does not come to be from being, except accidentally.
(B) What is does not come to be, except accidentally.
We can explain claim (A) by once again drawing on our earlier ac-
count of the accidentally/non-accidentally distinction. According to
that account, a thingX comes to be from being accidentally (rather
than non-accidentally) just in case:
(i) X comes to be from being; but
(ii) it is not by virtue ofX’s having been a being thatX was able
to come to be.
On Aristotle’s theory it is true that the statue comes to be ‘from
being’ (ἐξ ὄντος) in the sense that it comes to be from something ex-
istent, namely the unshaped block of marble that existed before.
Every instance of generation is an instance of coming to be ‘from
being’ in this sense: the new thing always comes to be from a pre-
viously existing precursor (see . , b–). So (i) holds in every
case of coming to be.
Further, although it is true that the statue comes to be from being
(in the above sense), it is not by virtue of its having previously been
a being that the statue was able to come to be. After all, there are
many beings from which statues are unable to come to be. Think
of unsculptable stuﬀs such as ﬁre or air, or of mathematical entities
such as numbers and points. The explanation of why the statue was
able to come to be is (once again) that the thing that currently has
the statue formwas previously an unshaped block of marble: an entity
capable of possessing the statue form, but actually lacking it. So we
can see that (ii) is true as well.
If a thing comes to be ‘from being’ in this way, we avoid the
problem raised in the puzzle (‘what is does not come to be, since it
already is’, a). This is because the unshaped block of marble,
though existent, is not already in the end state of the process
whereby the statue comes to be. The end state of this process (the
state into which the subject of the process changes) is not being or
existence, but instead having the form of the statue. Thus, while it
may be true that what already exists cannot now come into a state
of existence, this does not mean that it cannot come into the end
state of a process of generation.
I take Aristotle to be making this point about the end state of
 Of course, the statue does not come to be from its being existent.
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generation with claim (B): ‘What is does not come to be, except ac-
cidentally’. This claimmight be read in either of two ways. It might
be saying (B) that what is does not enter into a process of coming
to be, except accidentally. (On this reading claims (A) and (B) are
simply terminological variants of one another.) Or it might be say-
ing (B) that what is does not result from a process of coming to be,
except accidentally. The second reading is supported by Aristotle’s
subsequent argument for (B). He proceeds to argue that nothing
comes to be a being non-accidentally (b–). This corresponds
to (B) rather than to (B). It is a point about the end state of the
process of coming to be, rather than a point about its origin state.
Aristotle makes the point by way of a thought experiment: ima-
gine that a horse transmutes into a dog. In this hypothetical sce-
nario, the horse comes to be an animal only accidentally. While it is
true that the horse has become a dog, and that the dog is an animal,
it is not the case that being an animal is the end state of the change
undergone by the horse. The horse was an animal already, and so
could not have entered into a change the end state of which is being
an animal.
We should say the same thing about coming to be a being. When
the block of marble is sculpted into a statue, the marble comes to be
a being only accidentally. While it is true that the marble has be-
come a statue, and that the statue is a being, it is not the case that
being (or being a being) is the end state of the change undergone by
themarble. Themarble was a being already, and so it could not have
entered into a change the end state of which is being. On Aristotle’s
view the same holds in every other instance of generation: in every
case the subject of the process is a being already, and therefore be-
ing cannot be the end state of the process. The end state is instead
the possession of the relevant form.
 For the distinction between readings (B) and (B) see Kelsey, ‘I ’, –.
Kelsey himself favours (B), primarily because of the way the present section be-
gins (‘And in the same way . . .’). This suggests that the point at b– is meant
to be parallel to Aristotle’s previous point about coming to be from non-being. Since
that was a point only about the origin state of coming to be (and not about its end
state), Kelsey takes ‘in the same way . . .’ to imply that at b– Aristotle is once
again making a point only about the process’s origin state. I acknowledge that this
is a consideration in favour of (B), but I think that it is outweighed by the fact that
Aristotle’s subsequent argument is most plausibly read as concerning the end state.
 A good real-life analogy is Kelsey’s case of a carpenter making a chair from an
old table (‘I ’, ). The new chair is a piece of furniture, but being a piece of fur-
niture is not the end state of the change undergone by the table.
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... This does not violate the law of excluded middle The last
remark Aristotle makes about the present way of addressing the
puzzle is that it does not require us to posit a middle state between
being and non-being:
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἅπαν ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν. (b–)
And further, we do not destroy [the principle that] everything either is or
is not.
Everything either is or is not; the way to defuse the Eleatic puzzle
is not to deny this, but to identify unproblematic ways in which a
thing comes to be both from non-being and from being.
.. The second way of addressing the puzzle
A second way of addressing the puzzle is brieﬂy mentioned at
b–:
εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ ᾿ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν
καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ ᾿ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι ᾿ ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.
So this is one way [of addressing the puzzle]; another is that it is possible
to speak of the same things in terms of potentiality and actuality. But this
has been determined more precisely elsewhere.
The idea here would seem to be that there are two ways in which
a thing can exist: either actually or potentially. When the matter
of the statue (the marble) has the privation, the statue exists poten-
tially. Once the matter has taken on the form, the statue exists actu-
ally. Generation can thus be thought of as a process in which a thing
goes from existing potentially (when the matter has the privation)
to existing actually (when thematter has the form). Thismeans that
there is another way in which, on Aristotle’s theory of principles, a
thing comes to be both from being and from non-being: it comes
to be from a state of potential existence and from a state of actual
non-existence.
As before, this avoids the Eleatic diﬃculties. We avoid the diﬃ-
culty raised for the possibility of coming to be from being (‘what
is does not come to be, since it already is’), because the end state
of the process of generation is not—on this view—the generated
thing’s existence, but rather its actual existence. Since the gener-
ated thing exists only potentially—not actually—at the beginning
of the process, it is not already in the end state of the process.
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Again, the generated thing can come to be from being actu-
ally non-existent without this violating the principle that, in any
change, ‘something must underlie’. Although the generated thing
does not exist actually prior to the process of generation, it does ex-
ist potentially. And a potentially existing thing—unlike something
that exists neither actually nor potentially—can be the subject
of a change. This is because a potentially existing F is always
numerically identical to an actually existing G. The potentially
existing house, for instance, is numerically identical to an actually
existing pile of bricks. It follows that the potentially existing house
is capable of being aﬀected, and is therefore capable of undergoing
a change from one state to another.
.. The source of the Eleatics’ confusion
Aristotle now concludes his discussion by pinpointing the ultimate
source of the Eleatics’ ‘ignorance’ about the possibility of coming
to be:
ὥσθ ᾿ (ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν) αἱ ἀπορίαι λύονται δι ᾿ ἃς ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀναιροῦσι τῶν εἰ-
ρημένων ἔνια· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον καὶ οἱ πρότερον ἐξετράπησαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς
ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν καὶ ὅλως μεταβολήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἂν ὀφθεῖσα ἡ φύσις
ἅπασαν ἔλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἄγνοιαν. (b–)
So, as we were saying, the puzzles on account of which they were forced to
abolish some of the aforementioned things are resolved. For it was because
of this that the earlier philosophers were also turned so far oﬀ course from
the road leading to coming to be, passing away, and change in general. For
this nature, had they seen it, would have dissolved all of their ignorance.
I want to focus on the last sentence. As becomes clearer from
chapter , the phrase ‘this nature’ (αὕτη ἡ φύσις) refers to what
Aristotle had earlier (towards the end of chapter ) called ‘the
underlying nature’ (ἡ ὑποκειμένη φύσις, a–). That is, it refers
to the substratum or the matter that, on Aristotle’s theory, under-
lies the process of coming to be.
I suggest that Aristotle thinks the Eleatics fail to ‘see’ the under-
lying nature in the sense that they fail to see what it is that underlies
 So e.g. Ross, Physics, , and Charlton, Physics I–II, . This reading of the
phrase is conﬁrmed by what happens in . , where Aristotle discusses certain other
philosophers—Plato and his followers—who had ‘touched on it [sc. this nature], but
not suﬃciently’ (b–). Aristotle goes on to explain that these other philoso-
phers had some notion of the underlying nature, but failed properly to distinguish
the matter and the privation.
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in a process of coming to be. They conceive of coming to be as a
change whose subject is not the matter but the thing that comes to
be. It is this conception of coming to be that gives rise to the Eleatic
puzzle. If a thing is to come into being, it cannot already exist. And
yet something non-existent could not be the subject of any process
at all. If we assume that the subject of the process of coming to be
is the thing that comes to be, it apparently follows that coming to
be is impossible.
Aristotle says that if these philosophers had seen the underlying
nature, it would have ‘dissolved all of their ignorance’. He means, I
think, that the key to resolving the Eleatic puzzle is seeing what it is
that underlies. And this is surely true. Once we recognize that the
thing that underlies the process of coming to be is the matter, the
puzzle disappears. We may grant (i) that, prior to its coming to
be, a thing does not exist, and (ii) that a non-existent thing cannot
be the subject of a process or a change. But absent the assumption
that the subject of coming to be is the thing that comes to be, these
two claims exert no pressure on us to conclude that coming to be
is impossible.
It should be noted that onAristotle’s theory we are still able to say
that coming to be is a process in which a thing goes from not exist-
ing to existing. This is because of hylomorphism—the doctrine that
whatever comes to be is a composite of matter and form. When the
matter has the privation, the thing does not yet exist (in the sense
that it does not yet exist actually); once the matter has taken on the
form, the thing now exists (in the sense that it now exists actually).
So although Aristotle’s theory reconceives coming to be as a pro-
cess undergone by the matter, it still preserves the commonsensical
view that, when a thing comes to be, that thing goes from not ex-
isting to existing.
. Conclusion
Earlier in the paper I argued for an ‘existential’ interpretation of
the Eleatic puzzle described at Phys. . , a–. I pointed
 Cf. J. Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, ), .
 I therefore think that hylomorphism is an important part of Aristotle’s answer
to the puzzle about coming to be. For a contrary view, see S. Kelsey, ‘Hylomor-
phism in Aristotle’s Physics’, Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –.
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to several advantages of this interpretation: it avoids having the
puzzle presuppose an Aristotelian distinction between substances
and non-substances; it takes the passage’s distinction between com-
ing to be ‘from what is’ and ‘from what is not’ at face value; and it
makes good sense of the subarguments given against each option.
We have now seen a further merit of the interpretation: when the
puzzle is understood in this way, Aristotle’s theory of principles
successfully resolves it, just as he claims. The puzzle, thus inter-
preted, depends on the assumption that the subject of coming to be
is the thing that comes to be. The key Aristotelian move is to recon-
ceive coming to be as a process whose subject is the matter, which
changes from having the relevant privation to having the relevant
form. With this alternative conception of coming to be the puzzle
is resolved. As Aristotle shows in the second half of chapter , his
theory allows him to identify ways in which a thing comes to be
both from being and from non-being, and which avoid the Eleatic
diﬃculties.
To say that Aristotle’s theory successfully resolves the puzzle de-
scribed in Physics .  is not to say that he here provides a complete
vindication of the possibility of coming to be. His theory raises fur-
ther questions. For instance, on this view generation is a process in
which a persisting substratum changes from having one property to
having another. How, one might wonder, does this constitute the
emergence of a new thing, rather than merely being the modiﬁca-
tion of what was already there? In what way does this process diﬀer
from a case of ordinary change, as when a person goes from being
tanned to being pale? This is a genuine problem about generation,
and one that Aristotle recognizes he needs to address.But it is dis-
tinct from ‘the puzzle of the ancients’ that is under consideration in
Physics . . If the puzzle of .  is interpreted in the way I have
suggested, it seems to me that Aristotle’s response to it is a clear
success.
University of California, Berkeley
 For a defence of the claim that, in the theory of Physics , the matter persists
through the process of generation, see A. Code, ‘The Persistence of Aristotelian
Matter’, Philosophical Studies,  (), –.
 He addresses it in GC .
Created on 26 July 2015 at 18.41 hours page 149
 Timothy Clarke
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anagnostopoulos, A., ‘Aristotle’s Parmenidean Dilemma’ [‘Dilemma’],
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,  (), –.
Angioni, L., Aristóteles: Física I–II (Campinas, ).
Barnes, J., Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, ).
Barnes, J., The Presocratic Philosophers, rev. edn. (London, ).
Charlton, W., Aristotle: Physics, Books I and II [Physics I–II] (Oxford,
).
Code, A., ‘Aristotle’s Response to Quine’s Objections to Modal Logic’
[‘Response’], Journal of Philosophical Logic,  (), –.
Code, A., ‘The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter’, Philosophical Studies,
 (), –.
Cornford, F. M., Plato and Parmenides (London, ).
Horstschäfer, T. M., ‘Über Prinzipien’: Eine Untersuchung zur methodi-
schen und inhaltlichen Geschlossenheit des ersten Buches der Physik des
Aristoteles (Berlin, ).
Kelsey, S., ‘Aristotle Physics I ’ [‘I ’], Phronesis,  (), –.
Kelsey, S., ‘Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics’, Ancient Philosophy, 
(), –.
Laas, E., Aristotelische Textes-Studien (Berlin, ).
Loux, M. J., ‘Aristotle and Parmenides: An Interpretation of Physics Α ’,
Proceedings of the BostonAreaColloquium inAncient Philosophy,  (),
–.
Madigan, A., ‘Commentary on Loux’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Col-
loquium in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –.
Palmer, J., Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford, ).
Ross,W.D.,Aristotle’s Physics: ARevised Text with Introduction and Com-
mentary [Physics] (Oxford, ).
Wagner, H., Aristoteles: Physikvorlesung (Berlin, ).
Waterlow, S., Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: A Philo-
sophical Study (Oxford, ).
Wicksteed, P. H., and Cornford, F. M., Aristotle: The Physics, Books I–
IV (Cambridge, Mass., ).
Created on 26 July 2015 at 18.41 hours page 150
